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Presumed Fair? 
Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of our Criminal Justice 
System 
Vida B. Johnson* 
ABSTRACT 
The American criminal justice system is built on three bedrock principles: 
the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  These ideals, however, are frequently ignored by 
jurors.  Social science research has shown that jurors routinely believe that a 
defendant must prove his innocence, and that the mere fact that the defendant 
is standing trial is proof of guilt.  Jurors persist in these beliefs despite proper 
instructions on the law. 
Despite the acknowledged centrality of these legal ideals, trial courts in 
many jurisdictions, routinely prevent defense attorneys from questioning 
prospective jurors on these fundamental legal issues based on a mistaken view 
that jurors will follow the given instructions.  Unlike instructions, voir dire 
regarding prospective jurors’ ability or willingness to apply the presumption of 
innocence and hold the government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not granted uniformly across jurisdictions.  While the Supreme Court 
has sanctioned voir dire in capital cases on whether jurors can impose the death 
penalty, it has thus far remained silent on whether there is a right under the Due 
Process Clause to question prospective jurors on the presumption of innocence 
and the government’s burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.  The states 
and federal circuits are split on the question. 
This Article explores whether, in order to ensure fundamental principles of 
fairness, voir dire questions about the presumption of innocence and the burden 
of proof should be required in all criminal jury trials. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE RIGHT TO VOIR DIRE REGARDING THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
Three related legal principles are indispensable to a fair criminal 
trial: the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Over a century ago the 
United States Supreme Court declared “the principle that there is a 
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted 
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”1  The burden of 
the government to produce proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
 
 1  Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
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“dates at least from our early years as a Nation,” and the Supreme 
Court has concluded it is “basic in our law” and a constitutional 
requirement under the Due Process Clause.2 
These core principles are, unfortunately, too frequently ignored 
by jurors.  Legal instructions given by trial judges on the presumption 
of innocence and the burden of proof, while virtually universally given, 
are insufficient.  A mounting body of social science has shown that 
jurors routinely believe that a defendant must prove his innocence, 
and that the mere fact that the defendant is standing trial—following 
arrest and indictment—is proof of guilt.  Jurors persist in these beliefs 
despite proper instructions on these central legal principles. 
Jurors who refuse to apply these vital principles in criminal cases 
erode the very foundation of a fair trial.  Enforcement of these crucial 
doctrines in criminal jury trials requires a jury selection process that 
ferrets out the potential jurors who are unable to understand or 
unwilling to apply the presumption of innocence and the standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Despite the acknowledged centrality of these legal ideals, trial 
courts in many jurisdictions routinely prevent defense attorneys from 
questioning prospective jurors on these fundamental legal issues based 
on a mistaken view that jurors will follow the given instructions.  So, 
while the parties usually know a prospective juror’s age, field of 
employment, and neighborhood, arguably the most important 
information one needs to know about a juror sitting on any criminal 
case is missing—can the juror be fair? 
Unlike instructions, voir dire regarding prospective jurors’ ability 
or willingness to apply the presumption of innocence and hold the 
government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not 
granted uniformly across jurisdictions.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has thus far remained silent on whether there is a right under the Due 
Process Clause to such an inquiry, and the states and federal circuits 
are split on the question.3 
 
 2  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970) (quotations omitted). 
 3  United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 519 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that where 
there are sufficient instructions, voir dire on the presumption of innocence is not 
required); United States v. Miller, 758 F.2d 570, 572 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding no abuse 
of discretion for trial court not to question venire on presumption of innocence and 
reasonable doubt); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding 
that failure to allow voir dire on presumption of innocence upon request is error); 
State v. Dahlgreen, 512 A.2d 906, 910 (Conn. 1986) (finding that the trial court 
properly precluded voir dire on presumption of innocence); Baker v. State, 853 A.2d 
796, 805–06 (Md. 2002) (finding that voir dire on presumption of innocence not 
required); People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Ill. 1984) (holding that a trial 
court’s refusal to ask question about presumption of innocence warranted reversal of 
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There is, however, Supreme Court precedent regarding “death 
qualified” juries in capital cases that supports the argument for voir 
dire on the application of the presumption of innocence and the goal 
of “presumption of innocence qualified” juries.  In capital cases more 
expansive voir dire of the venire is allowed than is typical in most 
criminal trials.  Prosecutors routinely request that prospective jurors 
be “death qualified.”4  Specifically, prospective jurors are asked 
whether they would be able to return a death sentence in the event of 
a conviction.  Jurors who answer that they would be unable to return a 
death sentence in the event of conviction are struck from the jury 
panel “for cause.”  The resulting jury is referred to as “death-qualified.”  
After the Supreme Court held that the government was entitled to voir 
dire in order to ensure that jurors in capital cases would be willing to 
sentence a guilty defendant to death5, it ruled that capital defendants 
had a corollary right: the right to inquire if prospective jurors would 
automatically impose the death penalty upon a verdict of guilt and 
strike such jurors for cause.6  Thus, the Supreme Court has found both 
a government’s entitlement to voir dire concerning the prospective 
jurors’ willingness to apply the death penalty and a defendant’s right 
to voir dire regarding the prospective jurors’ willingness to not apply 
the death penalty where jury instructions that clearly require jurors to 
fairly consider both potential outcomes exists. 
Just as defendants in capital cases are entitled to voir dire in order 
to exclude jurors who, despite instructions to the contrary, would 
impose the death penalty in all cases following a finding of guilt, 
defendants in all criminal jury trials should be entitled to voir dire to 
exclude jurors who would disregard the presumption of innocence, 
and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because the 
very purpose of voir dire and the jury selection process is to eliminate 
jurors who cannot be fair, and because the presumption of innocence, 
 
conviction); State v. Cere, 125 N.H. 421, 424–25 (N.H. 1984) (finding that judges were 
required to ask whether juries believed that the defendant bears the burden of proving 
his innocence in a criminal case); Jones v. United States, 378 So.2d 797, 798 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980) (stating that defense attorney should be allowed to inquire of 
prospective jurors about the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof); 
Harper v. State, 474 S.E. 2d 288, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that questions of 
legal nature, like whether juror can follow instructions on the presumption of 
innocence, are “not within the purview of voir dire”); New Jersey v. Lumumba, 601 
A.2d 1178, 1189 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“[T]he jury must be asked whether 
they understand the basic principles of presumption of innocence . . . .”). 
 4  Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986) (finding that “death-
qualification” does not violate right to impartial jury). 
 5  Whitherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). 
 6  See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 170 n.7; Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). 
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and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are foundational 
legal principles without which there cannot be a fair criminal trial, an 
opportunity to conduct voir dire regarding the potential jurors’ 
willingness to apply these principles should be a requirement for every 
criminal jury trial. 
This Article explores whether voir dire questions about the 
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof should be 
required in all criminal jury trials.  To that end, the centrality of the 
presumption of innocence and standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt to a fair trial is briefly reviewed, the basic procedure and 
jurisprudence of voir dire, jury selection, and jury instructions will be 
explained, precedent for instructions regarding the three core 
principles is considered, along with the social science demonstrating 
the inadequacy of such instructions, precedent for voir dire regarding 
the three principles is reviewed, the entitlement to death-qualification 
voir dire is examined, the relationship between death-qualification voir 
dire and presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and standard of 
proof voir dire is explored.  Suggestions to defense attorneys concludes 
the Article. 
I.   THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF, AND 
THE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT: PRINCIPLES 
ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR TRIAL 
Our criminal justice system is premised on the lofty ideal of 
fairness7 and, according to the Supreme Court, “no right ranks higher 
than the right of the accused to a fair trial.”8  The presumption of 
innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are 
the legal principles comprising the foundation of any just criminal trial 
in the United States. 
The Supreme Court has observed that the presumption of 
innocence is “a basic component of a fair trial under our system of 
criminal justice,”9 and the history of the presumption of innocence has 
been “traced [ . . . ] from Deuteronomy through Roman law, English 
common law, and the common law of the United States.”10  The 
presumption of innocence is related to “the prosecution’s duty both to 
produce evidence of guilt and to convince the jury beyond a 
 
 7  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[O]ur system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”). 
 8  Press-Enter. v. Super. Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984). 
 9  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 
478, 479 (1978). 
 10  Taylor, 436 U.S. at 483. 
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reasonable doubt” before a criminal conviction may be obtained.11  
The Court has also noted that the presumption of innocence “cautions 
the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from 
the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their 
conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced.”12 
The presumption of innocence is first and foremost a trial right.13  
Because of the importance of this right, a number of safeguards have 
already been put in place to enforce it.  Jurors do not hear about an 
accused person’s prior conviction because of the presumption of 
innocence.14  The right of detained defendants not to be handcuffed 
or shackled before a jury15 or to wear civilian clothes in front of a jury16 
are just some examples of additional efforts to safeguard the rights of 
the criminally accused.  The Supreme Court has made it clear that trial 
courts have an obligation to take steps to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive the benefit of the presumption of innocence and 
that the government is held to its burden.17 
The presumption of innocence and the burden of proof in a 
criminal trial are related.  The standard of proof of beyond a 
reasonable doubt “provides concrete substance for the presumption of 
innocence” and has a “vital role in our criminal procedure,” which is 
“indispensable” and it is the “prime instrument for reducing the risk 
of convictions resting on factual error.”18  And “[t]he requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal cases is bottomed on a 
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”19  The 
Supreme Court has “explicitly [held] that the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”20 
 
 
 11  Id. at n.14. 
 12  Taylor, 436 U.S. at 485 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 13  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1979). 
 14  Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967) (Stuart, J., concurring) (“Evidence 
of prior convictions has been forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of 
innocence of the crime currently charged.”). 
 15  Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626–627 (2005) (reasoning that it was an error 
to shackle and handcuff defendant for the penalty phase of his capital trial). 
 16  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976). 
 17  Deck, 544 U.S, at 626–27; Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512. 
 18  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. 
 19  Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 20  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. 
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In addition to concluding that these principles are fundamental 
to a fair trial, the Supreme Court has also stated that “[i]t is self-
evident . . . that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury 
verdict are interrelated.”21  As this Article will discuss, however, the 
mechanisms required by the Supreme Court for ensuring verdicts 
based on these fundamental principles fall short, rendering these 
important principles and their underlying goal—a fair trial—in some 
instances an ideal rather than a reality. 
II.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE THREE PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
INEFFICACY 
Ensuring that verdicts in criminal cases are based on an 
application of the fundamental principles of the presumption of 
innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
requires at least two components: 1) legal instructions that accurately 
communicate the principles to the jury, and 2) jurors who are willing 
and able to follow those instructions.  Unfortunately, significant 
problems exist with both components.  The Supreme Court’s 
precedent thus far has focused on the first: jury instructions. 
A. Basics of Jury Instructions 
In every jury trial, the jury’s role is to consider the evidence and 
reach a verdict based on its view of the evidence within the legal 
framework provided by the judge.  Jury instructions are the law distilled 
for the jury, with the goal of accurately stating the law in terms that 
jurors can understand and apply.  Jury instructions in criminal cases 
generally include explanations of the presumption of innocence22 and 
the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.23 
Jurors are also instructed on the elements of the charged crime, 
any affirmative defenses, and rules regarding the consideration of 
certain types of evidence, e.g., “other crimes” evidence, impeachment 
evidence, evaluation of certain types of witnesses, and other case-
specific instructions.  Each individual instruction may not be long—
the model federal jury instruction about the presumption of 
innocence is just four sentences long—though when taken together 
the instructions can be very lengthy.24 
 
 21  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). 
 22  1-4 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL P 4.01, INSTRUCTION 4–1. 
 23  1-4 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL P 4.01, INSTRUCTION 4–2. 
 24  1-4 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL P 4.01, INSTRUCTION 4–1 reads: 
The defendant has pleaded not guilty to the charge in the indictment.  
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Jury instructions are stated orally by the judge, and in some 
courtrooms the judge will provide a written copy of the instructions 
either simultaneously with or subsequent to providing the instructions 
orally.  Most instructions are provided after the close of evidence and 
are frequently provided even after the closing arguments of counsel.25  
Legal instructions are rarely provided prior to the evidentiary portion 
of trial.26  And although pre-instruction has gained in popularity and 
proved effective, the practice continues to be relatively uncommon in 
trial courtrooms.27 
Jury instructions are often complicated and quite lengthy.28  While 
written instructions have proved to be a helpful aide to jurors’ 
comprehension of often complex and lengthy legal instructions, fewer 
than half of trial judges follow the practice of providing written 
instructions to jurors.29  When written instructions are provided, they 
are usually provided after the close of all evidence and trial judges do 
not always provide sufficient copies of the instructions for each juror 
to have her own copy.30  As will be discussed, legal instructions and the 
manner in which they are provided do not sufficiently educate jurors. 
 
 
 
 
To convict the defendant, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the 
defendant’s guilt of each element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This burden never shifts to the defendant, for the simple reason 
that the law presumes a defendant to be innocent and never imposes 
upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any 
witness or producing any evidence.  In other words, each defendant 
starts with a clean slate and is presumed innocent of each charge until 
such time, if ever, that you as a jury are satisfied that the Government 
has proved a given defendant is guilty of a given charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 25  How Courts Work, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIVISION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_edu
cation_network/how_courts_work/juryinstruct.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
 26  See Gregory E. Mize, Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L.Waters, The States-of-the-
States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report 36 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncsc-
jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx.  
 27  G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR & G. MARC WHITEHEAD, 
JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 132–2 (2006). 
 28  Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 449, 451–52 (2006). 
 29  Mize et al., supra note 26, at 37. 
 30  Id.  Of the judges that do provide written instructions to the jurors, only one-
third provide them to all of the sitting jurors.  Id.  
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B. Instructions on the Presumption of Innocence and the Standard of 
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Because the legal principles concerning the presumption of 
innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt have 
been recognized as being fundamental to a fair criminal trial, jury 
instructions communicating those principles are required in jury trials.  
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, a capital murder case, the Supreme Court held 
that because the Due Process Clause requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury trial 
are interrelated, a guilty verdict in a criminal jury trial must be based 
on a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.31  In other words, 
the jury must be properly instructed on the government’s burden to 
present evidence of guilt, and that the evidence of guilt must rise to 
the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may 
return a guilty verdict.32  The Supreme Court has further held that 
where the jury instructions fail to accurately communicate the burden 
of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, structural error has occurred: 
harmless-error analysis does not apply and automatic reversal is 
required.33 
Where the jury has been properly instructed on the government’s 
burden and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, separate 
instruction on the presumption of innocence is still a virtual 
requirement, although the Supreme Court has stopped short of 
holding it to be structural error or even necessarily constitutional error 
requiring reversal unless the error can be deemed harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  In Taylor v. Kentucky,34 a robbery case, the jury was 
properly instructed with respect to the government’s burden of proof 
of beyond a reasonable doubt, but the trial court denied the defense 
attorney’s request for separate jury instructions explaining the 
presumption of innocence and the related legal principle that 
indictment has no evidentiary weight.35  The Supreme Court reversed 
Taylor’s conviction.36  In reaching its conclusion, the Court observed 
that the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof of beyond 
a reasonable doubt are “equally fundamental” and logically related 
 
 31  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. at 280–82. 
 34  Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 35 After the presentation of evidence, the attorney’s second request for the 
instructions was again refused.  Id. at 481. 
 36  Id. at 490. 
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principles.37  Although the principles are related, the Court noted that 
“scholars advise against abandoning the instruction on the 
presumption of innocence, even when a complete explanation of the 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is provided.”38  The Court 
favorably quoted language from Wigmore that an instruction 
specifically on the presumption of innocence “‘cautions the jury to put 
away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the 
indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely 
from the legal evidence adduced.’”39  The Court concluded that an 
instruction on the presumption of innocence has a “purging effect” 
that is a “means of protecting the accused’s constitutional right to be 
judged solely on the basis of proof adduced at trial.”40 
The Court in Taylor held that an instruction on the presumption 
of innocence was required and reached this conclusion despite the fact 
that defense counsel had discussed the presumption of innocence in 
both his opening statement and closing argument because “arguments 
of counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court.”41  The Court 
was also not swayed by the fact that defense counsel had, during an 
attorney-conducted voir dire, asked potential jurors about their 
understanding of the presumption of innocence.42  The Court, 
however, did not explicitly hold that a separate instruction on the 
presumption of innocence is required in every trial, instead holding 
that on the “facts of this case”—where the instructions on the 
government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt were 
“spartan” and the prosecutor made arguments about the standard in 
closing—an instruction on the presumption of innocence was 
required.43 
Justice Brennan joined the Court’s opinion in Taylor, but wrote a 
separate concurrence simply to note that “as is clear from the Court’s 
opinion . . . trial judges should instruct the jury on a criminal 
defendant’s entitlement to a presumption of innocence in all cases 
where such an instruction is requested.”44  The following year, however, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kentucky v. Whorton, to 
 
 37  Id. at 483 n.12. 
 38  Id. at 484 (quoting J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 551–76 
(1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 805–06 
(2d ed. 1972). 
 39  Id. at 485 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940)).  
 40  Taylor, 436 U.S at 486 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). 
 41  Id. at 488–89 (citations omitted). 
 42  Id. at 479–80. 
 43  Id. at 486–87, 490. 
 44  Id. at 490–91 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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determine whether the Kentucky Supreme Court had correctly 
interpreted the Court’s holding in Taylor as requiring a presumption 
of innocence instruction in all criminal trials.45  The Court held that it 
had not created such a requirement, and that a failure to provide a 
requested instruction on the presumption of innocence may violate 
the Due Process Clause when considered “in light of the totality of the 
circumstances,” including the other jury instructions.46  Heeding 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Taylor, and avoiding an unnecessary 
risk of constitutional error, most—if not all—jurisdictions have 
implemented standard jury instructions on the presumption of 
innocence.47 
C.  Inadequacy of Presumption of Innocence Jury Instructions & 
Instructions in General 
While the Court has recognized the importance of these legal 
principles, regrettably many jurors do not recognize their significance.  
The required instructions on the government’s burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the instructions on the presumption 
of innocence, which are now provided in virtually every criminal jury 
trial, do not ensure that the principles are enforced in every criminal 
jury trial.48  Instructions vary from one jurisdiction to another.  Many, 
 
 45  Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 787 (1979). 
 46  Id. at 790. 
 47  Mize et al., supra note 26, at 36. 
 48  While apparently every jurisdiction has standardized instructions on the 
principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the language within the instructions varies between 
jurisdictions.  Compare 1-1 MD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY § 1.05, 
INSTRUCTION 1.04 (1998), stating: 
[A] reasonable doubt is a doubt founded upon reason.  Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt requires such proof as would convince you of the truth 
of a fact to the extent that you would be willing to act upon such belief 
without reservation in an important matter in your own business or 
personal affairs. 
with 1-II CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.108, stating: 
[R]easonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable 
person, after careful and thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the 
graver or more important matters in life.  It is not an imaginary doubt, 
however, nor a doubt based on speculation or guesswork; it is a doubt 
based on reason.  The government is not required to prove guilt beyond 
all doubt, or to a mathematical or scientific certainty. Its burden is to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
and MA SUP. CT. CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.1.2, explaining: 
[W]hat is proof beyond a reasonable doubt?  The term is often used and 
probably pretty well understood, though it is not easily defined.  Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all 
possible doubt, for everything in the lives of human beings is open to 
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if not all, jurisdictions presume that jurors—who swear an oath to apply 
the law as it is stated to them—follow the jury instructions.49 
Not only are jurors presumed to understand the trial court’s 
instruction, the Supreme Court has said that even jurors who have 
expressed confusion on a legal issue, and are then pointed back to the 
same instruction that was the source of the original confusion that 
jurors are nevertheless, “presumed to understand a judge’s answer to 
its question.”50  So even in the face of evidence of juror confusion, 
courts insist that jurors understand and will follow instructions. 
While the assumption that jurors can understand the instructions 
given to them is common, it is an inaccurate one.  Jurors, of course, 
are lay people with varying levels of education and comprehension 
who tend not to have legal training.  Studies show that even well-
meaning jurors have a difficult time understanding the legal 
instructions given to them.  Studies consistently show since 1970 that 
“jurors do not understand their instructions.”51  Despite forty years of 
evidence, jury instructions and the manner in which they are delivered 
have changed little.52  One researcher has written that “comprehension 
by jurors of the instructions given them is dysfunctionally low.”53  
Another has said that “lay persons are frequently bewildered by the 
wording of jury instructions.”54  The process of instructing the jury can 
take a significant amount of time especially in more complicated cases 
that involve various theories of liability or multiple charges.  Little is 
done to ensure that jurors understand or even pay attention to the 
instructions given by the trial judge.  One observer has forecasted that 
 
some possible or imaginary doubt.  A charge is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt if, after you have compared and considered all of the 
evidence, you have in your minds an abiding conviction, to a moral 
certainty, that the charge is true. 
 49  See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (finding that death 
sentence should be upheld despite questions by jury about legal instructions and 
where judge responded to the questions using the same instruction); Harris v. United 
States, 602 A.2d 154, 165 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (“The jury is presumed to have 
followed these instructions . . . and this court will not upset a verdict by assuming the 
jury declined to do so.” (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted)); Hall 
v. United States, 171 F.2d 347, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (“[J]urors should be presumed 
to have understood and followed the court’s instructions.”); Landay v. United States, 
108 F.2d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 1939); Parmagini v. United States, 42 F.2d 721, 724 (9th 
Cir. 1930). 
 50  Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234. 
 51  Walter W. Steele, Jr., Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 
N.C.L. REV. 77, 79 (1988). 
 52  Marder, supra note 28 at 452, 458–75. 
 53  Steele, supra note 51, at 92. 
 54  Bethany Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension 
Issue, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 702 (2000). 
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“adequate juror comprehension is unattainable.”55 
The most likely reason for the juror comprehension problem is 
that legal instructions are written above the ability level of most jurors.  
The average legal instruction is written at or above a 12th  grade level,56 
while the typical adult American has an 8th grade reading 
comprehension level.57  Some even believe this figure to be declining.58  
And with most legal instructions delivered orally, the fact that listening 
comprehension may be even lower than reading comprehension59 
should be yet another cause for concern.  One legal observer has said 
that the jurors are like students studying for an exam when they are 
given legal instructions because they are learning topics previously 
foreign to them.60  However, unlike students, jurors are never tested on 
their knowledge of any topic, are limited in their ability to ask 
questions, and are asked to absorb a large amount of information in a 
relatively compact period of time. 
Jurors’ struggles with comprehending the law extend even to the 
core legal principles necessary to a fair criminal trial: the presumption 
of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
One study showed that 50 percent of prospective jurors believed that 
it was the defendant who had to prove his innocence.61 That same study 
showed that 49.9 percent of people who had previous jury experience 
agreed that defendants had to prove their innocence.62  A Washington 
Post poll showed that 31 percent of people believed that if a person 
had been charged with a crime, he was probably guilty of at least some 
crime.63  In another poll, about 30 percent of people eligible for jury 
 
 55  John P. Cronan, Is Any of this Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid 
Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1187, 1189 (2002). 
 56  Rachel Small, Judith Platania and Brian Cutler, Assessing the Readability of Capital 
Pattern Jury Instructions, THEJURYEXPERT.COM (Jan. 31, 2013), available at http:// 
www.thejuryexpert.com/2013/01/assessing-the-readability-of-capital-pattern-jury-
instructions/. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Hector Tobar, American Adults Have Low (and Declining) Reading Proficiency, LA 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/books/jacketcopy/la-et-jc-american-
adults-have-low-and-declining-reading-proficiency-20131008-story.html. 
 59  Small et al., supra note 56 (“[It is] likely that jurors would experience greater 
difficulty with listening comprehension compared to reading comprehension.”). 
 60  Dumas, supra note 54, at 714. 
 61  HEARST CORPORATION, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, THE MEDIA AND THE JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM: A NATIONAL SURVEY ON PUBLIC AWARENESS AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, tbl. 5D at 
15 (1986). 
 62  Id. 
 63  NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, 1 JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2:7 (Nov. 2014) 
(citing Turner, Tabulation of Attitude Data on Criminal Justice Issues from A National Survey 
(Washington, D.C.: National Research Council- National Academy of Sciences) 
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service in Miami and Atlanta thought that a person is probably guilty 
if the person is charged by the government and brought to trial.  Even 
worse, more than 40 percent of people eligible for jury service in those 
two cities expected a defendant to prove his innocence despite a judge’s 
instructions on the matter.64 
In addition to jurors who are unable to intellectually grasp the 
legal instructions given by the judge, there are some jurors who are 
simply unwilling to follow the law.  These are jurors who have hostility 
toward criminal defendants generally.  There are members of the 
public who for whatever reason—the media’s sensationalist focus on 
crime,65 racial animus toward the race of the accused,66 or a simple 
belief that because the defendant was arrested, that is sufficient to show 
his guilt—do not believe in the presumption of innocence or believe 
that the burden should be on the government to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Jury instructions on the law will come too late for 
these people if they are unwilling to follow the law, even if they can 
understand it. 
These people will not be identified if voir dire on the burden of 
proof and the presumption of innocence is not allowed.  Without 
questioning during the voir dire practice, the possibility exists that 
some people with general opposition to those accused of crime will sit 
on juries either unfairly convicting defendants or causing a mistrial in 
a case that would otherwise result in an acquittal. 
The results of these studies likely reflect a combination of jurors 
who are unable to understand the jury instructions, which can be 
complicated and lengthy, and jurors who understand the principles 
but are unwilling to apply them.  Ultimately, the studies show that 
instructions alone do not serve to enforce the principles that are the 
 
(unpublished manuscript) (June 1979)). 
 64  NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, 1 JURYWORK SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2:7 (Nov. 2014) 
(citing a National Jury Project poll from 2005). 
 65  For a discussion on the news media, the internet, and crime dramas creating a 
“climate of fear” in the mainstream public, see Rachel Lyon, Media, Race and the Death 
Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 743–52 (2009).  She finds that people who watch 
television news are the most likely to be fearful of crime.  Id. at 746.  The demographics 
of viewers of these programs are the ones “most likely to be jury members.”  Id. at 751.  
She also shows that defense attorneys are portrayed negatively on most crime dramas 
while police and prosecutors are portrayed generally as benevolent actors who rarely 
make mistakes.  Id. at 752.  See also Perry Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and 
Legal Decision Making, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 856–61 (2010). 
 66  Jonathan Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist 
Assumptions, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 999, 1015 (2013) (“[J]urors are more likely 
to associate black defendants with guilt . . .”).  See also Justin Levinson, Huajian Cai & 
Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Bias: the Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010). 
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foundation of a fair trial.67  Instead, the jury selection process, through 
voir dire, must produce juries composed of individuals who are willing 
and able to apply the presumption of innocence, the standard of 
proof, and the burden of proof.  Voir dire on the issues of burden of 
proof and the presumption of innocence will allow trial courts to 
dismiss for cause jurors who refuse or are unable to hold the 
government to its burden, and allow defense attorneys to exercise 
peremptory challenges for those the attorney suspects is unable to 
follow the law.  Voir dire also has the added benefit of exposing jurors 
early on to the legal principles prior to their synthesizing evidence or 
hearing arguments from either side. 
III.  VOIR DIRE REGARDING THE THREE PRINCIPLES IS A NECESSARY 
MECHANISM TO ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL 
Questioning during voir dire that will identify jurors who are 
unable or unwilling to follow the law is a way to enforce the 
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in jury trials.  If trial courts allow a broader voir dire 
and jury selection process, that may increase the likelihood that the 
selected jurors will in fact apply the legal principles as they are stated 
in the jury instructions.  Ignoring the fact that a substantial number of 
jurors do not follow the law guarantees trials that are unfair to criminal 
defendants. 
A.  Basics of Voir Dire and Jury Selection 
The purpose of voir dire is to identify members of the venire who 
are unfit to sit as jurors during the trial.68  During the voir dire process 
the entire jury panel is placed under oath and asked a series of 
questions.  The answers to these questions inform the parties’ motions 
 
 67  Some of the jurisdictions polled, e.g. Florida, allow voir dire on the 
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof.  See FL 
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.7.  The study that polled Miami 
residents covered potential jurors, not individuals who had been subject to the voir 
dire process.  NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, 1 JURYWORK SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2:7 (Nov. 
2014).  The voir dire process in Florida should serve to filter out most of the 
problematic potential jurors.  There is no reason to believe that Miami residents think 
differently than potential jurors in other jurisdictions; in fact, the polls from other 
jurisdictions show relative uniformity in that regard.  Many other jurisdictions, 
however, do not have voir dire processes like Florida’s to filter out the problematic 
potential jurors. 
 68  Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but 
Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 
UCLA L. REV. 262, 300 (2012).  See also Ann Roan, Reclaiming Voir Dire, 37 THE 
CHAMPION 22 (2013). 
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and the trial court’s decisions to strike individuals from the panel “for 
cause” if they are unable or appear to be unable to serve as competent, 
impartial jurors.69  There is no limit to the number of potential jurors 
who may be excluded for cause, because even one juror who is biased 
or unable to follow the instructions impairs the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.  Generally, however, there is a high bar and trial courts 
exercise strikes “for cause” sparingly.70 
Without voir dire, it is impossible to identify which jurors are 
unwilling or unable to follow the law and decide the case impartially.  
As early as 1895, the Supreme Court had observed that a “suitable 
inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror has any 
bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair 
determination by him of the issues to be tried.”71  In 1981, the Supreme 
Court recognized that the voir dire process is an essential mechanism 
to obtaining a fair trial: 
Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal 
defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury will be honored.  Without an adequate voir dire[,] the 
trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who 
will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions 
and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.72 
During jury instructions, jurors passively listen (if they do), during 
the course of voir dire interaction and participation is required.  Jurors 
must actively think in order to respond to questions posed during voir 
dire instead of simply listening to the judge’s lecture about the law.  
Thus, voir dire is necessary to identify members of the panel who 
should not sit as jurors in the trial.  Without the direct questioning, 
they likely would not be identified. 
The potential jurors’ responses during voir dire also inform the 
parties’ decisions to exclude certain individuals from the panel with 
peremptory strikes.  Unlike strikes for cause, peremptory strikes are 
strictly limited in number.  Each side gets an equal number of 
 
 69  In Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887), the court listed the bases for strikes 
for cause at the time in the state of Utah: 
Consangunity or affinity within the fourth degree . . . . [b]eing the party 
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having complaint against or 
being accused by him in a criminal prosecution . . . .[h]aving served on 
a trial jury which has tried another person for offense charged in the 
indictment . . . . [h]aving formed or expressed an unqualified opinion 
that the prisoner is guilty or not guilty. 
 70  Barbara Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 
549–58 (1975). 
 71  Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895). 
 72  Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981). 
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peremptory strikes,73 although the number of peremptory strikes varies 
between jurisdictions and based on the type of charge.74  Also unlike 
strikes for cause, the parties, rather than the trial judge, control the 
exercise of peremptory strikes. The parties may employ a peremptory 
strike to eliminate a prospective juror for any reason at all, except for 
the prospective juror’s race or gender.75  Because the peremptory 
challenges are limited in number, the parties would also prefer to have 
an undesirable juror struck for cause by the judge rather than employ 
a peremptory strike.76 
The Supreme Court has described peremptory strikes as “a means 
to achieve the end of an impartial jury,”77 and stated that the right to 
exercise peremptory challenges is “one of the most important of rights 
secured to the accused.”78  Peremptory challenges, however, are not 
required by the Constitution and “it is for the State to determine the 
number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose 
and the manner of their exercise.”79  Thus, the Supreme Court has held 
that where a defense attorney uses a peremptory strike to remove a 
prospective juror who the trial judge should have removed for cause, 
there is no constitutional error.80  Voir dire, however, is necessary for 
the informed exercise of peremptory challenges, and “the informed 
exercise of jury challenges is an essential element in insuring jury 
impartiality.”81 
 
 
 
 73  If there are co-defendants, the number of peremptory strikes is generally 
divided equally among them.  See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. 634(B)(1) (“[I]n trials involving 
joint defendants, the defendants shall divide equally among them that number of 
peremptory challenges that the defendant charged with the highest grade of offense 
would have received if tried separately; provided, however, that each defendant shall 
be entitled to at least 2 peremptory challenges.”). 
 74  FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) allows 20 strikes for each side in a capital case, 10 or 6 
depending on the type of felony charge, and 3 for misdemeanor offenses. 
 75  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105–08 (1986) (holding that the government 
may not use peremptory challenges to exclude people on the basis of race); J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (extending Batson to gender). 
 76  Roan, supra note 68. 
 77  Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). 
 78  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1965) (citing Pointer v. United States, 
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)). 
 79  Ross, 487 U.S. at 89. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Davis v. Florida, 473 U.S. 913, 914 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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B. Limitations of the Voir Dire Process 
Despite the ambitious goals of voir dire, some scholars argue that 
voir dire is not particularly effective at identifying bias.82  In large part, 
the effectiveness of voir dire depends on the specific manner in which 
it is implemented.  For example, in some courtrooms questions are 
asked of the panel as a whole, and prospective jurors are asked to 
provide their answers while the other prospective jurors listen.  Other 
judges conduct voir dire with only a single prospective juror at a time 
up at the bench so that the jurors cannot hear one another’s answers 
to questions.  Some legal scholars and psychologists believe that voir 
dire of a prospective juror in front of the entire panel is less valuable 
at recognizing juror biases because jurors are less likely to acknowledge 
their biases in front of others, preferring to present themselves “in a 
socially desirable light” before a group.83  Many people have anxiety 
over public speaking in general, and it is undoubtedly daunting to 
admit to bias or an unwillingness to follow the rule of law just 
announced to the group in front of a large group of people rather than 
a single judge and a few lawyers.  Nonetheless, voir dire before the full 
panel is the more common practice84 due to concerns about judicial 
economy.85 
Voir dire conducted primarily by attorneys rather than the judge 
is more effective.  Studies show that responses by jurors to questions 
asked by attorneys are typically more candid than questions asked by 
judges.86  Jurors are less intimidated by lawyers and therefore are less 
likely to give only “socially acceptable,” but inaccurate, answers to an 
attorney as compared to a judge.87  Attorneys are also more likely to 
know the details and “nuances” of their case, and in that way are more 
likely to get useful information from voir dire than in judge-conducted 
voir dire.88  Despite these advantages, many jurisdictions either 
 
 82  See Jeffrey Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into 
Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 525, 533 (1977). 
 83  Marie Comiskey, Does Voir Dire Serve as a Powerful Disinfectant or Pollutant? A Look 
at the Disparate Approaches to Jury Selection in the United States and Canada, 59 DRAKE L. 
REV. 733, 745 (2011). 
 84  Approximately one third of judges allow jurors to answer questions in privacy.  
Mize, supra note 26, at 28–29. 
 85  Christopher Mallios & Toolsi Meisiner, Using Voir Dire to Eliminate Jury Bias, 2 
STRATEGIES NEWSLETTER 2, 2–3 (2010), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
programs_orgs/gjc/documents/EducatingJuriesInSexualAssaultCasesPart1.pdf. 
 86  Frank P. Andreano, Voir Dire: New Research Challenges Old Assumptions, 95 ILL. B.J. 
474 (2007).  See also Susan E. Jones, Judge-Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical 
Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM BEHAV. 131–46 (1987). 
 87  Mize, supra note 26, at 28. 
 88  Id. at 28. 
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prohibit entirely or limit attorney-conducted voir dire.89 
Despite its flaws, voir dire remains the chief vehicle allowed by 
trial courts to ferret out bias or ignorance of the law amongst potential 
jurors.90  There is no other standard mechanism within our justice 
system to ensure that juror bias is brought to the attention of the 
parties: regardless of its effectiveness, voir dire remains the only tool 
available to defendants and their lawyers to safeguard the right to a 
jury comprised of neutral, unbiased fact-finders who are willing and 
able to apply the law as it is stated to them.  As such, sufficient voir dire 
is a necessity in achieving a fair trial. 
C. Judge’s Broad Discretion to Limit Voir Dire 
The limitations on the effectiveness of voir dire have been 
encouraged by the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review 
for voir dire procedures that the Supreme Court and lower appellate 
courts adhere to.  In one of its earliest opinions regarding voir dire, 
Connors v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s 
refusal to “permit certain questions to be propounded to [prospective] 
jurors” because the voir dire process “is conducted under the 
supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to 
its sound discretion.”91  In Aldridge v. United States, the Court recognized 
the trial court’s “broad discretion as to the questions to be asked” 
during the voir dire process.92  In Ham v. South Carolina, the Court 
similarly acknowledged the “traditionally broad discretion accorded to 
the trial judge in conducting voir dire . . . “93  More recently, in Skilling 
v. United States, the Court stated that “[n]o hard-and-fast formula 
dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire.”94 
The Supreme Court has adhered to this deferential review despite 
its recognition of the importance of voir dire to fair trials.  Justice 
White’s plurality opinion in Rosales-Lopez stated that “the lack of 
adequate voir dire impairs the defendant’s right to exercise 
peremptory challenges” and leaves the trial judge unable to fulfill his 
duty “to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to 
follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence.”95  
 
 89  Id. at 27. 
 90  Id. at 533–-534. 
 91  Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 412–16 (1895).  Connors was charged 
with election fraud and stealing ballot boxes, and sought to pose questions to 
prospective jurors regarding their political beliefs.  Id. 
 92  Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931). 
 93  Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973). 
 94  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010). 
 95  Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.184, 188 (1981). 
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Nonetheless, he maintained that “the adequacy of voir dire is not easily 
subject to appellate review.”96  Justice White justified affording trial 
judges “ample discretion” because they “must rely on [their] 
immediate perceptions” of the potential jurors.97  Appellate courts 
have also granted broad discretion to trial courts regarding voir dire. 
As a result of the broad discretion granted to trial courts and the 
restrained review of the Supreme Court and other appellate courts, 
voir dire practices vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
even among judges within the same jurisdiction.98  As noted above, 
depending on the jurisdiction, voir dire may be conducted by lawyers, 
judges, or both.99  Some trial courts use written questionnaires rather 
than oral questioning of the venire, while some trial judges may 
employ both modes of questioning in the same case.  In federal courts 
and in the District of Columbia trial court, the trial judge conducts the 
voir dire with little attorney involvement.100  When attorneys are 
allowed to engage in questioning of prospective jurors, judges can 
control that questioning by requiring the attorneys to submit their 
proposed questions in advance or foreclosing lines of questioning as 
they are posed.  With few exceptions, discussed infra, the trial judge’s 
discretion controls what questions are asked during the voir dire 
process. 
D. Trial Court Incentives to Limit Voir Dire 
Trial judges often cite to a purported incentive to limit the voir 
dire process: efficiency.  Jury trials can be a significant investment of 
judicial and government capital.  Courts have always been concerned 
about the length of time necessary for voir dire.101  Particularly on 
crowded criminal dockets in cities and other large jurisdictions, trial 
judges feel pressure to limit voir dire in order to move trials along and 
clear their cases. 
 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. at 189. 
 98  Mize, supra note 26, at 27. 
 99  Twenty-three states have predominantly or exclusively attorney-conducted voir 
dire, nine states and the District of Columbia have predominant or exclusive lawyer-
conducted voir dire.  Eighteen states have voir dire conducted by both attorneys and 
judges equally.  Id. at 28, tbl. 21. 
 100  See FED R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (“[T]he court may examine prospective jurors or may 
permit the attorneys for the parties to do so.”).  See also D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 
24(a) (“The Court may permit the defendant or the defendant’s attorney and the 
prosecutor to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination.”). 
 101  See James Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on their Willingness to Follow 
the Law, 60 IND. L.J. 163, 180–81 (1985). 
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Voir dire, by its nature, does not lend itself well to efficiency.  
Typically, scores of citizens are called to comprise the panel of 
potential jurors in a criminal case.  Because of the strikes for cause and 
peremptory strikes, far more people are needed than the twelve to 
fourteen jurors who ultimately serve on a criminal jury of typical size.  
Adequate questioning of this many individuals—often more than 
fifty—can take hours or even days.  In high profile cases, when many 
prospective jurors are struck for cause due to exposure to media 
publicity, hundreds of prospective jurors may be called for a voir dire 
process that can take weeks. 
There is no doubt that courts are extremely concerned with the 
length of voir dire and trials generally.102  In a footnote about a serious 
felony trial with substantial media attention, in which voir dire was 
more than six weeks long, the Supreme Court remarked, “a voir dire 
process of such length, in and of itself undermines the public 
confidence in the courts and the legal profession.”103 
The desire to increase the efficiency of the trial process leads 
judges to choose voir dire procedures that are less effective at exposing 
juror biases.  For example, attorney-conducted voir dire is more likely 
to produce forthcoming answers from prospective jurors regarding 
bias, as discussed supra.  In jurisdictions where voir dire is attorney-
conducted, however, voir dire tends to be longer.  In states with judge-
dominated voir dire, the process takes far less time.104  South Carolina’s 
criminal jury selection is judge-conducted and the median length of 
voir dire is just thirty minutes.105  This is in contrast to Connecticut, 
which has attorney-conducted voir dire and the longest median length 
of voir dire—ten hours.106  Most jurisdictions have opted for the more 
efficient, but less effective judge-conducted voir dire procedure.  
Similarly, questioning of prospective jurors individually is more 
effective, but less efficient—and less utilized—than requiring 
prospective jurors to answer before the entire panel. 
For thirty years, legal observers have noted that, “judicial economy 
and a desire to assure speedy trials have placed the juror voir dire 
examination at the lowest level of priority in a trial.”107  The time 
 
 102  Id. 
 103  Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Court of California, Riverside Cnty. 464 U.S. 501, 510 
n.9 (1984). 
 104  Mize, supra note 26, at 31. 
 105  Id. at 29. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Beverly Jennison, Trial Court Discretion in Conducting the Voir Dire Subjected to More 
Stringent Scrutiny: Cordero v. United States, 33 CATH U.L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1984).  See also 
Robert Hanley, Getting to Know You, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 865 (1991). 
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required for judges or attorneys to ask the additional voir dire 
questions and prospective jurors to answer them is not the only added 
inefficiency.  When more questions and more probing questions are 
posed to the prospective jurors, more prospective jurors are identified 
as unfit and struck for cause, requiring even more prospective jurors 
to be summoned and questioned for each criminal case.  This, of 
course, increases both the burden on the community for more 
prospective jurors and the length of the jury selection process even 
more.  The cost to the courts and the community should be considered 
insignificant if it ensures a fair outcome. 
Concerns about judicial resources continue even as more are 
resolved via guilty pleas rather than trials.  Jury trials in many 
jurisdictions have plummeted.108  The Supreme Court recently 
observed that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and 
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”109  
The increasing number of guilty pleas may make some judges even 
more impatient with the amount of time consumed by jury trials, 
including voir dire.  A guilty plea is generally resolved in a matter of 
minutes, whereas jury trials can consume days or weeks.  While a guilty 
plea is generally the result of both the prosecutor and the defendant 
reaching an agreement, a given judge may be more inclined to focus 
their frustration on the failure of the parties to reach an agreement on 
the defendant because the judge has likely seen the prosecutor reach 
agreements in many other cases, making it appear that the defendant 
is upsetting the apple cart by rejecting a plea offer.  This frustration 
can lead to an unwillingness to allow a probing, effective voir dire 
process. 
In addition to concerns about judicial economy, judges may worry 
that allowing voir dire on a particular legal topic will unfairly highlight 
an issue before any evidence has come into the case.110  In an assault 
case, for example, a trial judge might worry that allowing voir dire 
questions about self-defense before the defendant has presented 
evidence of self-defense (rather than present no defense case and 
simply rely on the presumption and the burden) might provide the 
defense with an unfair advantage.111  Along those lines, there may be a 
 
 108  John Simerman, In New Orleans, Jury Trials Plummet While Conviction Rate Rises, 
THE ADVOCATE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/8007281-
148/in-new-orleans-jury-trials. 
 109  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). 
 110  Gold, supra note 101, at 174. 
 111  Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Court of California, Riverside Cnty, 464 U.S. 501, 510 
n.9 (1984). 
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concern that certain questioning might “indoctrinate” prospective 
jurors.112  Chief Justice Burger writing for the Court in Press-Enterprises, 
noted that, “[t]he process is to ensure a fair impartial jury, not a 
favorable one.  Judges, not advocates, must control that process to 
make sure privileges are not so abused.”  Questions that accurately 
reflect the law regarding the presumption of innocence, the burden of 
proof, or the reasonable doubt standard, principles that are integral to 
every single criminal trial, thus will not unfairly tip the scales or 
generate a jury “favorable” to the defense. 
Apprehensions about efficiency that lead to a shorter voir dire are 
likely to hamper indigent defendants more than the relatively small 
number of criminal defendants with significant financial means.  
Defendants with resources (and prosecutors113 and police) can spend 
funds investigating prospective jurors, including hiring jury 
consultants or investigators with expertise in researching the 
backgrounds of prospective jurors.114  Public defenders and other 
court-appointed defense attorneys generally do not have the financial 
means for this type of investigation.  Allowing insufficient voir dire also 
runs the risk of unfairly benefiting the government over the defense 
because prosecutors may not have to meet their burden of proof if 
jurors are unwilling to enforce it.  This ultimately will result in 
prejudicial burden-shifting or burden-reducing.  Efficiency concerns 
should not override a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  In addition, 
these anxieties should be lessened as a result of the high number of 
cases settling via guilty plea. 
IV.  PRECEDENT RELATED TO VOIR DIRE ON THE PRESUMPTION OF 
INNOCENCE AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
The fundamental nature of the presumption of innocence and 
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt combined with the 
studies and polls, discussed supra, indicating that jurors do not always 
apply these principles even after instruction, dictate in favor of 
requiring voir dire, in every criminal case, to determine if prospective 
jurors are willing and able to apply these legal principles.  Almost three 
 
 112  Gold, supra note 101, at 170. 
 113  Keith Alexander, Questions Arise Over Criminal Background Searches of Jurors in D.C. 
Superior Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/crime/questions-arise-over-criminal-background-searches-of-jurors-in-dc-
superior-court/2013/12/08/fa612fec-4e13-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html. 
 114  For a discussion on investigation of jurors, see generally Eric Robinson, Virtual 
Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating Jurors Online, 36 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597 
(2013). 
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decades ago, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in State v. Cere115 
followed this line of reasoning and required that in every criminal jury 
trial in that state prospective jurors “shall be asked” about their 
willingness to apply the presumption of innocence, the burden of 
proof, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.116  In 
reaching its conclusion that a specific inquiry regarding these legal 
principles was necessary in every criminal case, the court specifically 
referenced “a 1983 national survey commissioned by the Hearst 
Corporation” that found that fifty percent of those surveyed believed 
that a defendant must prove his innocence at a criminal trial and “of 
those surveyed who had served as jurors, 49.9% “ held the same belief.117  
The court also relied on a recent New Hampshire trial where ten or 
eleven of twelve prospective jurors expressed a belief that the 
defendant must prove he is innocent.118  The court concluded that a 
specific inquiry into prospective jurors’ willingness and ability to apply 
the core principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of 
proof, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would 
“aid in ensuring the integrity of jury verdicts.”119 
The United States Supreme Court, however, has remained silent 
on the issue of whether or not a specific inquiry into prospective jurors’ 
willingness and ability to apply the presumption of innocence and the 
standard of proof is required in all criminal trials to ensure the 
integrity of jury verdicts.  The Court has remained silent despite a split 
among the federal circuits; most circuits that have considered the issue 
have ruled that such an inquiry is not required.120  State high courts 
 
 115  Other state high courts have reached similar conclusions.  The Illinois Supreme 
court found in People v. Zehr,  469 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (1984) that the refusal to ask 
questions about the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof required 
reversal of a conviction.  The court specifically addressed the issue that the requested 
voir dire questions pertained to matters of law and instruction.  The Court wrote: 
We are of the opinion that essential to the qualification of jurors in a 
criminal case is that they know that a defendant is presumed innocent, 
that he is not required to offer any evidence in his own behalf . . . . [A]n 
instruction given at the end of trial will have little . . . effect [for jurors 
who are prejudiced against any of these “basic guarantees”]. 
See also Jones v. State, 378 So.2d 797, 798 (Fl. 1980) (holding that a defense attorney 
should be allowed to inquire of prospective jurors about the presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof); New Jersey v. Lumumba, 601 A.2d 1178, 1189 
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that a jury must be asked whether they “understand 
the basic principles of presumption of innocence . . .”). 
 116  State v. Cere, 480 A.2d 195, 198 (N.H. 1984). 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. 
 120  But among the federal circuits, the Sixth stands alone on voir dire on the 
presumption of innocence.  
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have also split on the issue.121 
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Blount,122 found that failure to 
allow voir dire on presumption of innocence upon request is 
erroneous.  It explained that, “[t]he primary purpose of voir dire of 
jurors is to make possible the empanelling of an impartial jury through 
questions that permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by 
counsel.”123  It reasoned that, “a challenge for cause would be sustained 
if a juror expressed his incapacity to accept the proposition that a 
defendant is presumed to be innocent . . . “ that “since the failure may 
have resulted in the denial of an impartial jury, the error cannot be 
dismissed as harmless.”124  The Sixth Circuit’s test makes sense; instead, 
if the answer is one that would identify a juror as someone who would 
have to be dismissed for cause, the question is one that is essential to a 
fair trial. 
The argument for a specific inquiry into these related core legal 
principles is supported not only by the studies and polls indicating that 
jurors do not always apply them even when instructed, but also by 
Supreme Court precedent regarding other questions that must be 
asked during the voir dire process. 
With respect to specific areas of inquiry during voir dire, the 
Court has generally concluded that a defendant is entitled to specific 
questions only where the failure to ask those questions will render the 
trial “fundamentally unfair.”125  Unless there is some “special 
circumstance” present, a “generalized but thorough inquiry into the 
impartiality” of the prospective jurors is all that is constitutionally 
required.126 
The Supreme Court has found voir dire inquiry into a particular 
subject required where it involves bias specific to the defendant or to 
the case.  In Morford v. United States the defendant was convicted of 
refusing to produce records and the names of individuals associated 
with the National Council for American-Soviet Friendship.127  After the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Morford’s conviction, the 
Supreme Court reversed because the trial court had denied specific 
questioning of prospective jurors who were federal government 
 
 121  See note 4. 
 122  United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973). 
 123  Id. at 651. 
 124  Id. 
 125  Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 426 (1991); see also Morgan, 504 U.S. at 747 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 126  Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986); see also Morgan, 504 U.S. at 747 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 127  Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
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employees regarding “the possible influence of the ‘Loyalty Order,’”128 
which subjected all federal employees to “discharge upon reasonable 
grounds for belief that they are disloyal to the Government of the 
United States.”129  The Court found reversible error because the refusal 
to inquire about this potential bias because “‘[p]reservation of the 
opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right 
to an impartial jury.’”130  The Court in Morford did not articulate a 
standard, the satisfaction of which would trigger the constitutional 
entitlement to inquire into a potential area of bias.  The Court 
referenced Dennis v. United States, where the inquiry had been allowed 
and all the prospective jurors who were government employees denied 
being biased by the order, the Court subsequently dismissed Dennis’s 
concerns about the order as “vague conjecture.”131  While Morford is 
distinguishable from the question of inquiring about fundamental 
legal principles, i.e. bias related to an issue that arises in every criminal 
case, the studies referenced supra are an even greater indication of the 
potential for bias than the Loyalty Order which triggered the need for 
inquiry in Morford’s case. 
The Supreme Court later clarified, at least to some extent, the 
standard a defendant must satisfy in order to trigger constitutionally 
required inquiry into specific subject areas during voir dire in a 
number of cases involving the potential for racial bias.  In Aldridge v. 
United States, the African American defendant accused of killing a white 
police officer requested that prospective jurors be asked about whether 
they were racially prejudiced against African Americans.132  The trial 
court refused.  The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 
“essential demands of fairness” under the circumstances of that case 
required a specific inquiry regarding racial prejudice.133  The Court 
also noted that “no harm would be done in permitting the question, 
but if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would 
preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be 
perpetrated in allowing him to sit.”134 
 
 
 
 
 128  Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258, 259 (1950). 
 129  Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 165 (1950). 
 130  Morford, 339 U.S. at 259 (quoting Dennis, 339 U.S. at 171–72). 
 131  Id.; Dennis, 339 U.S. at 172. 
 132  Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 309–10 (1931). 
 133  Id. at 310. 
 134  Id. at 314. 
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In Ham v. South Carolina the defendant was an African-American 
man who was involved in the civil rights movement and charged with 
possession of marijuana.135  The defense at trial was that the police 
officers in the South Carolina town were framing the defendant 
because of his civil rights activities.136  Ham requested questions to 
uncover bias against black people generally.137  The Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause “requires that under the 
facts shown by this record the petitioner be permitted to have the juror 
interrogated on the issue of racial bias.”138 
In Ristaino v. Ross, however, the Supreme Court placed significant 
limitations on its holdings in Aldridge and Ham.139  In that case, Ross, an 
African American, was convicted of an armed robbery and assault with 
intent to murder of a white Boston University security guard.140  Ross 
argued that because he was African American and charged with 
committing violent crimes against a white person, he was 
constitutionally entitled to a specific inquiry of the prospective jurors 
regarding racial bias, an inquiry the trial court had denied.141  The 
Court held that Ham did not require such an inquiry in every criminal 
trial where there “may be a confrontation between persons of different 
races or different ethnic origins.”142  The Court concluded that specific 
inquires into a particular form of bias are  only constitutionally 
required if, “under all of the circumstances presented there [is] a 
constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about 
racial prejudice, the jurors would not be as indifferent as (they stand) 
unsworn.”143  The Ristaino Court concluded that although the 
defendant and the victim were from different races or ethnic groups, 
because there were no other racial issues involved the circumstances 
of the case “did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial 
prejudice might infect Ross’s trial.”144 
In Rosales-Lopez, a man of Mexican descent was accused of illegally 
transporting undocumented Mexicans into the country.  The evidence 
against him included the fact that he was engaged in a sexual 
relationship with a young white woman, the mother of the 
 
 135  Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973). 
 136  Id. at 525. 
 137  Id. at 525–26. 
 138  Id. at 527. 
 139  Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976). 
 140  Id. at 590. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 596 (quotations omitted). 
 144  Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 598. 
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prosecution’s key witness.145  The plurality opinion found no error, 
stating that a trial court’s failure to honor a request for specific inquiry 
into the racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors is only 
“reversible error where the circumstances of the case indicate that 
there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have 
influenced the jury.”146  Justice White, writing the plurality opinion, 
concluded that there was no such possibility, in part because the trial 
court had asked questions during voir dire regarding the prospective 
jurors’ feelings about illegal immigration.147 
Allowing a juror who refused to apply the presumption of 
innocence, or hold the government to its burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, to sit on a criminal jury would perpetrate as “gross 
[an] injustice” as seating a juror who is racially biased against the 
defendant.  The studies discussed above indicating a high percentage 
of prospective jurors’ unwillingness to apply these fundamental 
principles of law, certainly meet Ristaino’s “significant likelihood” 
standard.  The issue should qualify as a “special circumstance,” 
although that term obviously does not properly describe a 
circumstance that presents a problem facing every criminal trial.  
Social science, however, should be considered just as powerful proof 
of a significant likelihood of bias as the common sense determinations 
made by the Court in Ham and Aldridge. 
The Supreme Court’s precedent has demonstrated a more 
expansive view of the requirements for voir dire in death penalty cases, 
particularly with respect to the sentencing phase in capital cases.  In 
Turner v. Murray, for example, the Court held that every death penalty 
case involving an “interracial crime” requires informing the 
prospective jurors of the races of the defendant and the alleged victim 
and questioning “on the issue of racial bias.”148  The Court, however, 
was fractured with respect to the reasoning for this holding.149  Justice 
White, who wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, 
and O’Connor, that the holding was limited to the sentencing phase 
of death penalty cases because jurors during the sentencing phase 
versus the guilt/innocence phase of a capital trial.150  “[W]ith respect 
to the guilt phase,” Justice White wrote, “we find this case to be 
 
 145  Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, at 184, 193 (1981). 
 146  Id. at 191 (emphasis added). 
 147  Id. at 193. 
 148  Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986). 
 149  Id. at 28–53. 
 150  Id. at 28–29, 37–38, 38 n.12. 
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indistinguishable from Ristaino, to which we continue to adhere.”151  
Oddly, because voir dire regarding racial prejudice necessarily must 
occur before the guilt/innocence phase, capital defendants in 
subsequent cases of interracial crime receive the salutary benefit of a 
voir dire regarding racial prejudice although they are technically not 
entitled to it.  Turner’s case, however, was remanded only for a new 
sentencing phase, not a new trial.152  Both Justice Brennan and Justice 
Marshall wrote dissents criticizing the absurdity of voir dire regarding 
racial prejudice for the sentencing phase of a capital trial, while 
disavowing the need for such questions during the guilt/innocence 
phase of any criminal trial.153 
Despite the rigorous limits placed on defense voir dire, 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court does not require any “special 
circumstance” or “significant likelihood” to trigger the prosecution’s 
entitlement to voir dire regarding a juror’s willingness to apply the 
death penalty if a capital defendant is found guilty.  In Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, the Court held that the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to a trial by an impartial jury were violated because 
the trial court excluded for cause all prospective jurors who expressed 
objections to capital punishment.154  In a footnote—one that gave rise 
to the so-called “death qualified” jury—the Court noted that 
prospective jurors may be excluded for cause from capital trials if they 
make it “unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote 
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any 
evidence . . . or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would 
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s 
guilt.”155  The Court explicitly stated that the voir dire process would be 
used to reveal the prospective jurors’ positions on these issues.156 
The Supreme Court subsequently broadened the category of 
prospective jurors who could be properly excluded for cause in Adams 
v. Texas.157  There the Court concluded that jurors could not be struck 
for cause “unless [their] views [on capital punishment] would prevent 
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath.”158  It was decided that 
 
 151  Id. at 37–38. 
 152  Id. at 38. 
 153  Id. at 39, 45. 
 154  Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
 155  Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis added). 
 156  Id. 
 157  Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980). 
 158  Id. 
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on the facts of the case, some prospective jurors had been improperly 
excluded.159  Then, in Wainwright v. Witt, the Court clarified that the 
language in Witherspoon’s footnote 21 was dicta and that the Adams 
standard controlled, emphasizing that the Adams standard 
“dispens[es] with Witherspoon’s reference to ‘automatic’ decision 
making” and “does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with 
‘unmistakable clarity.’”160  The Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion 
of a juror who had indicated that she “thought” her views on the death 
penalty would interfere with her ability to judge the case, answers that 
were obtained through pointed questions about the juror’s beliefs 
about the death penalty.161 
The Supreme Court clarified in Lockhart v. McCree that the 
prosecution’s entitlement to have prospective jurors whose views 
against the death penalty would substantially impair their judgment of 
the case excluded for cause necessarily included an entitlement to 
specific voir dire aimed at discovering those views: 
The state may challenge for cause prospective jurors whose 
opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would 
prevent them from impartially determining a capital 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.  Ipso facto, the state must be 
given the opportunity to identify such prospective jurors by 
questioning them at voir dire about their views on the death 
penalty.162 
There is no indication in Lockhart that the state’s opportunity to voir 
dire jurors about their views on the death penalty is limited in any way: 
it applies in every capital case.  This entitlement is conferred to the 
prosecution without any showing of special circumstances or a significant 
likelihood that the prospective jurors will be biased against imposition 
of the death penalty. 
In Morgan v. Illinois, the Court held that defendants in capital 
cases are entitled to the defense-corollary of death-qualification voir 
dire questions.163  The Court held that under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment “a capital defendant may challenge for 
cause any prospective juror” who “will automatically vote for the death 
penalty in every case” and therefore would “fail in good faith to 
consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating 
 
 159  Id. at 49. 
 160  Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). 
 161  Id. at 415, 430. 
 162  Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170 n.7 (1986). 
 163  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735–36 (1992). 
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circumstances[.]”164  Just as the Court in Lockhart determined that the 
prosecution was entitled to specific voir dire to discover disabling views 
against the death penalty, the Court in Morgan concluded that 
defendants are entitled to specific voir dire aimed at discovering a 
prospective juror’s disposition to vote for the death penalty regardless 
of the evidence and instructions.165  The Court concluded that if voir 
dire were “not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner’s 
challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who would always 
impose death following conviction, his right not to be tried by such 
jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless as the State’s 
right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who would never do 
so.”166  In reaching this conclusion, the Court specifically rejected the 
argument that “direct inquiry into [the] matter” was not necessary “so 
long as . . . other questioning purports to assure the defendant a fair 
and impartial jury able to follow the law.”167 The Court reasoned that 
“Witherspoon and its succeeding cases would be in large measure 
superfluous were this Court convinced that such general inquiries 
could detect those jurors with views preventing or substantially 
impairing their duties in accordance with their instructions and 
oath.”168 
The right of a criminal defendant to exclude prospective jurors 
who are unable or unwilling to apply the presumption of innocence 
and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is more 
fundamental than the right of a capital defendant to exclude 
prospective jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty 
upon a finding of guilt.  Certainly, the right of the accused should 
trump any of the government’s entitlements to voir dire, as the 
defendant is the one on trial and whose constitutional rights the court 
is there to uphold.  Nor is there any reason to believe that such views 
will be exposed by general inquiry rather than specific questioning any 
more so than the problematic views about the death penalty would be 
so exposed.  Indeed, polls show that a large percentage of jurors 
believe a defendant is required to prove his innocence, which 
demonstrates that general inquires do not serve to lay bare such bias. 
 
 
 
 164  Id. at 729.  It is unclear why the Court used the “automatically” language 
explicitly eschewed by the Court in Witt.  469 U.S. at 424. 
 165  Morgan, 504 U.S. at 733–34.  
 166  Id. at 733–34 (emphasis in original). 
 167  Id. at 729. 
 168  Id. at 734–35. 
JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2015  9:27 PM 
576 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:545 
The Third Circuit in United States v. Wooton, a case that pre-dates 
Lockhart, Morgan, and Ristaino, articulated a number of arguments 
against a requirement for specific voir dire regarding prospective 
jurors’ willingness to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.169  
The main argument is that a general inquiry about whether the 
prospective juror will uphold the law and only consider the evidence 
presented will reveal a prospective juror’s inclination to disregard the 
presumption of innocence or the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.170  General questions like these are asked routinely, but the polls 
discussed above indicate that despite the broad use of these general 
questions, individuals who believe that a defendant must prove his 
innocence are nonetheless serving on juries for criminal cases.  
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that problematic views 
regarding the presumption of innocence or the standard of proof will 
be revealed without specific inquiry any more than there is reason to 
believe that problematic views regarding the death penalty will be 
revealed by general questioning in capital cases, where prospective 
jurors are undoubtedly informed that the case involves the death 
penalty. 
The court in Wooton also reasoned that because specific inquiries 
are only constitutionally required when they reveal bias, whereas 
inquiries regarding prospective jurors’ willingness to apply the 
reasonable doubt standard “related to a rule of law and the juror’s 
willingness to apply it,” no such inquiry can be constitutionally 
required.171  The court in Wooton was ruling without the benefit of the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent holdings in Lockhart and Morgan, which 
make clear that an inquiry into prospective jurors’ willingness to apply 
a rule of law—in those cases the law regarding imposition of the death 
penalty—can be constitutionally required because it reveals potential 
partiality. 
The Wooton court also expressed concerns about efficiency and 
the “slippery slope” of requiring specific inquiries regarding areas of 
the law: “If the principle is valid as to the reasonable doubt inquiry, it 
would also be valid for similar inquiries” regarding “constitutional, 
substantive and procedural law that must be contained in instructions 
to the jury,” which would ultimately thwart the “public interest in 
reasonable expedition” of criminal trials.172  While the studies and polls 
discussed earlier certainly indicate a real need to inquire specifically 
 
 169  United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943, 946–47 (1975). 
 170  See id. at 946. 
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. at 946–47 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
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about prospective jurors’ willingness to adhere to the presumption of 
innocence and the government’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, there is no basis to suggest that specific inquiries are necessary 
with respect to other legal issues in criminal trial, such as hearsay, 
impeachment, or unanimity.  Furthermore, as discussed supra, the 
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof are fundamental 
principles without which there cannot be a fair criminal trial.  The 
fundamental nature of these principles, unlike the rules of hearsay for 
example, merits specific inquiry.  Finally, the Supreme Court has 
already started down the “slippery slope” of specific inquiry regarding 
legal principles in Lockhart and Morgan, and if there are going to be 
specific inquiries regarding legal principles they should include the 
most fundamental principles necessary for a fair criminal trial. 
V.  MOVING FORWARD TOWARDS SPECIFIC VOIR DIRE REGARDING THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF, AND THE 
STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
The notion of a presumption-of-innocence-and-burden-of-proof 
qualified jury in a criminal trial should be entirely uncontroversial.  
Courts should be concerned with identifying jurors who will be unable 
or unwilling to follow the law.  Those concerns should trump any 
efficiency concerns, especially because as we have seen the number of 
cases that make it to trial has dwindled to only five percent.173  
Nevertheless, many defense attorneys seeking a specific inquiry 
regarding prospective jurors’ views of the presumption of innocence 
and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will still face an 
uphill battle: only one federal circuit and a handful of state high courts 
have found that specific voir dire regarding these fundamental 
principles is required, and reviewing courts continue to grant trial 
courts broad discretion with respect to the voir dire process. 
Defense attorneys practicing in the jurisdictions where there are 
neither precedent nor custom that establishes specific voir dire 
regarding these principles174 should request it and appeal denials of 
the request when it is not granted.  This can be done in advance of trial 
and in writing via a motion in limine.  In every trial case, defense 
attorneys should submit proposed voir dire that includes questions on 
this topic.  Keeping the proposed questions as short as possible and 
litigating the issue on paper (as opposed to during valuable in-court 
 
 173  See discussion supra notes 109–110. 
 174  Virtually every jurisdiction outside of Florida, New Jersey, Illinois, and the Sixth 
Circuit.   
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time) will help avoid the courts’ concerns about efficiency.175  Requests 
for questionnaires (rather than live voir dire) on the issues completed 
by jurors outside the courtroom can also save the court time. 
Arguments about the importance of voir dire on these bedrock 
principles of law compared to the government’s need for a “death-
qualified jury” should be advanced.  Certainly no one can dispute that 
a defendant’s right to have a jury comprised of people willing to 
presume him innocent and hold the government to its high burden 
would trump that of the government’s entitlement to ask questions 
before trial about a juror’s ability to impose the death penalty in the 
event of a conviction.  Even as compared to the concerns posed in the 
racial bias cases addressed by the Supreme Court, the necessity of a 
jury that understands and is willing to follow the very fundamental 
doctrines of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt are at least as significant as those race-bias 
cases.  So while there is not a Supreme Court case directly on point, 
the precedent supports the arguments for a voir dire on the 
presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defense attorneys in jurisdictions where voir dire on other legal 
issues is allowed may be in a position to achieve a presumption of 
innocence qualified jury sooner.  In United States v. Allsup, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed a conviction where the trial judge refused to voir dire 
the jury panel on the insanity defense.176  In that case, voir dire was 
judge-conducted.177  The trial judge asked the defense attorney 
whether he would commit to an insanity defense.  It was only when he 
refused that the judge refused to voir dire on the issue.178  The Ninth 
Circuit found that the defense attorney should not have to predict with 
certainty his defense.179  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 
found reversible error where a trial judge failed to ask members of the 
jury pool, upon defense counsel’s request, whether they would hold 
 
 175  Almost thirty years ago, James Gold suggested voir dire on legal issues to be 
simple in his article cited supra note 101, at 188.  He suggested that the question be 
posed, “If the judge instructed you that . . . is there any reason why you would be 
unwilling or unable to follow that instruction?”  I would suggest a single question like, 
“The judge will instruct you that _______ is presumed innocent.  The judge will also 
instruct you that the government has the burden of proof, not ___, and that burden is 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Do any of you believe that that you would be 
unwilling or unable to follow that instruction?”  This sort of questioning might only 
elicit “yes” answers because it suggests what the correct answer should be.  A more 
open-ended questioning might result in more candid responses. 
 176  United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 75–76 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 177  Id. at 70. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. at 70. 
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the testimony of police officers in higher regard because of their 
profession.180 
Given that both police officer credibility and the insanity defense 
are issues about which the jury would receive instructions from the 
court, these cases are hard to square with the logic of United States v. 
Price,181 where the Ninth Circuit, en banc, found no abuse of discretion 
in failing to voir dire the jury on the presumption of innocence and 
the burden of proof.  Illustrating how these cases are at odds with one 
another along with the use of social science that shows the difficulty 
jurors have with these legal issues, should allow the defense to prevail.  
Price and cases like it in other jurisdictions simply fail to address the 
social science illustrating how little prospective jurors understand 
these core legal values.  Bringing the data to trial and appellate courts 
attention may increase the likelihood of voir dire on these essential 
legal issues. 
Use of the social science is the defense attorney’s key to getting 
the voir dire necessary for defendants.182  Both requests in the trial 
court and on appeal should consider explicit reliance on the social 
science that demonstrates the need for specific inquiry regarding these 
fundamental principles.  Unfortunately, the polls are likely to be 
criticized because some are dated.  There is, however, no reason to 
believe that Americans’ views regarding the presumption of innocence 
or the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt have subsequently 
shifted.  Public defender offices and defense firms should, however, 
consider pooling resources in order to fund a new round of polling on 
these issues.183  If the courts are to be receptive to this issue at all, it will 
 
 180  See e.g., United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Contreras-Castro, 825 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Washington, 819 F.2d 
221 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 181  United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 182  Reliance on social science has swayed courts on the issue of eyewitness 
identification, juvenile culpability, adolescent brain development, and the death 
penalty for those with mental health issues.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–19 
(2002) (utilizing scientific arguments of brain development to declare death penalty 
for mentally retarded persons unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565–
72 (2005) (reasoning that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional and cites to 
developmental differences between juveniles under 18 and adults); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 67–69 (2010) (reasoning that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
imposition of life without parole sentence on juvenile offender who did not commit 
homicide); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462–66 (2012) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of life without parole sentence on juvenile 
offenders). 
 183  Given the crisis in indigent defense, funds for such a poll, which if professionally 
administered may run in the tens of thousands of dollars, may be scarce.  Partnering 
with a psychology department at a nearby university or a law school may help with 
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likely depend on updated polling demonstrating that deeply 
problematic views regarding these principles continue to exist on a 
widespread basis. 
Concerted efforts by defense attorneys to raise the issue and well-
reasoned appellate briefs and arguments will someday hopefully bring 
about the presumption of innocence and burden of proof qualified 
jury. 
 
 
access to resources. 
